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1. INTRODUCTION
The rational choice theory of turnout, as originally formulated by Downs
(1957) as a decision theory problem, and later formulated by politicalscien-
tistsingametheoreticterms, isperhapsthemostcontroversialformaltheory
in political science. The main reason for this controversy is that in its purest
instrumental form - where voting is costly, no voter obtains direct utility
from the act of voting itself, and benets are discounted by the probabil-
ity of casting a pivotal vote - the basic theory grossly underpredicts turnout
rates in mass elections. This should not be a huge surprise - it is probably
more than mere coincidence that the act of voting is one of the least well
understood phenomena in the study of politics. Why do some people vote
and others not? What affects turnout rates? Indeed, differences between
poll predictions and actual electoral outcomes can often be accounted for
by a failure to accurately predict turnout.
This underprediction of turnout rates in mass election has been called
the paradox of voter turnout. This paradox has kindled intense debate
about the value of the rational choice approach to the study of political
behavior in general. Green and Shapiro (1994), in their harsh critique of
rational choice theory use it as a centerpiece, and it serves as a poster boy
for critics of the homo economicus approach to political science. Fiorina
(1989), himself sympathetic to the rational choice approach, dubbed it the
paradox that ate rational choice theory.
1
A variety of modications to the basic model lead to a correction of the
underpredictionofturnout, butsuch revisionsare justiablycriticizedasbe-
ing ad hoc and narrowly tailored to the voter turnout problem itself. There
has been extensiveempirical work that examines the comparativestatic pre-
dictions of the theory, and some that even try to estimate parametric models
of the rational choice theory of turnout. But with rare exceptions, eld data
sets provide too little control over the distribution of voter preferences and
voting costs to give much power to the tests. However, regardless of the
scientic nature of these tests, in elections with over 100 million voters, the
parameters required to justify turnout rates much above 0, using a model
where voting is instrumental and costly, would seem implausible to many.
What about other implications of the rational choice theory of turnout?
For example, there are a number of comparative static effects. This paper
focuses on three of them. First, an increase in the size of the electorate
should lead to lower turnout rates. We call this the size effect. Second,
turnout should be higher in elections that are expected to be closer if every-
one voted. We call this the competition effect. Third, turnout among sup-
porters of the more popular candidate or party should be less than turnout
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among supporters of the less popular candidate. We call this the under-
dog effect. All three of these comparative static properties of the rational
choice theory of turnout are stated with the usual ceteris paribus condition.
That is, they are only necessarily true according to the theory if absolutely
every other factor affecting turnout is held constant. That includes voter in-
formation, the distribution of voting costs, candidate quality, weather, elec-
tion technology, age, income, education, voter accessibility to poll sites,
and on and on. Some of these variables can and have been controlled for
in empirical studies as we discuss below. It turns out that the theory is hard
to reject, but this is partly due to weak tests, and the fact that all these tests
are highly parametric. Consequently, the theory may t a particular dataset
wellwithone parametrizationof the distributionof votingcosts andbenets
and less well under other parametric assumptions. The choice of parameter
space is usually made for reasons of convenience or analytical tractability,
rather than a priori theoretical reasons.
This paper takes a different approach. We use laboratory experiments to
fully control for the preferences, voter information, costs, electorate size,
and competitiveness. We choose a voting environment that, for very large
elections, would predict very low turnout.
2 While our experiments do not
employ 100 million subjects, they are large by the standards of laboratory
experiments - large enough for us to obtain great variation in predicted
turnout rates. We have a two dimensional design of treatments that allow us
to simultaneously test the size effect, the competition effect, and the under-
dog effect. Perhaps even more signicantly, we have chosen parameters for
our experimental voting environments that imply a unique quantitative pre-
diction of the rational choice theory of turnout for each of the treatments.
By varying the parameters the design enables us to see where the theory
fares well and where it fares less well, both qualitatively (the comparative
static predictions) and quantitatively (the exact turnout rates).
PreviouspapersbySchramandSonnemans(1996), CasonandMui(2005),
and Grosser, Kugler and Schram (2005) have studied strategic voter par-
ticipation in the laboratory. However, these experiments have focused on
homogeneous voting costs. This implies a plethora of mixed strategy equi-
libria as characterized in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983), and so makes it
difcult to determine how well the theory performs. In the eld of course,
voter participation costs are heterogeneous. Here we study a model with
2Asymptotically, turnout for our parametrization is 2%. Previous voter turnout exper-
iments have explored environments where theoretical turnout is always large, regardless
of the number of voters. Not surprisingly, they observe high turnout rates. We choose a
parametrization that leads to relatively rapidly declining turnout for two reasons: rst, it
enables us to test that turnout declines as the theory predicts. Second, if we allowed many
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heterogeneous and privately known participation costs, as in Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1985). This leads to strong predictions, as the Nash equilib-
rium under our parameters is unique. We nd in the laboratory that the
theory performs remarkably well at the aggregate level, predicting partici-
pation rates and comparative statics well, and doing a good job predicting
participation even in relatively large elections, with only moderate amounts
of overparticipation. At the individual level, the model fares less well, as
individual behavior is too noisy to be consistent with Nash equilibrium. A
quantalresponse equilibriummodelbased on stochasticchoice, on the other
hand, does somewhat better in the aggregate, while accounting much better
for individual behavior. One feature of strategic voting that deserves em-
phasis is that the types of individual errors predicted by quantal response
equilibrium have relative little impact on aggregate participation rates - this
"robustness"appears to be a key feature of strategic modelsof voter turnout.
2. THE MODEL
The experiments are based on the Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) model of
turnout when voters have privately known voting costs. There are N voters,
dividedinto two groups, the supporters of candidate A and the supporters of
candidate B. In Palfrey and Rosenthal, it was assumed that the two groups
were equal in size, but here we consider the minor extension where the size
of group A is NA and the size of group B is NB, and NA < NB. The two sizes
are assumed to be common knowledge to all voters. We will refer to group
A as the minority group and group B as the majority group. We will refer to
candidate A as the underdog and candidate B as the frontrunner. The voting
rule is simple plurality. Voters decide simultaneously whether to cast a vote
for their preferred candidate or to abstain. Whichever candidate receives
more votes wins the election, with ties broken randomly. If candidate A
wins then all members of group A receive a reward of H and all members of
group B receive a reward of L < H. If candidate B wins then all members
of group B receive a reward of H and all members of group A receive a
reward of L < H. These reward are common knowledge. Voting is costly,
and the voting cost to voter i is denoted ci. Voter i knows ci before deciding
whether to vote or abstain, but the distribution from which the voting costs
of other voters are drawn - each voter's cost is an independent draw from
the same distribution. The density function of the cost distribution, f(c);
exists and is common knowledge and assumed to be positive everywhere
on the support.
A quasi-symmetric equilibrium of the voting game is a pair of turnout
strategies, (tA;tB), where tA species the probability a member of groupTHE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 4
A votes, as a function of his or her voting cost. The assumption of quasi-
symmetry is that all members of the same group use the same strategy. It
is straightforward to prove existence of a quasi-symmetric equilibrium in
cutpoint strategies. Moreover, all equilibria must use cutpoint strategies,
which greatly simplies the analysis. A cutpoint strategy for voter i speci-
es a critical cost level, c
i with the property that voter i abstains if and only
if ci > c
i . Hence, a quasi-symmetric equilibrium is given by a pair of num-
bers (c
A;c
B) corresponding to the cutpointused by membersof group A and
group B, respectively. A quasi symmetric equilibrium implies an aggregate























In order for (c
A;c
B) to be an equilibrium, all voters must be optimizing,
and this condition boils down to requiring that a voter with a cost equal















j is the probability that a vote by a member of group j will be
pivotal (make or break a tie), given the equilibrium voting strategies of all
other members of both groups. Since a voter will create a tie if and only if
the number of other members voting in his own group is exactly one less
than the number of members voting in the other group, and will break a tie
if and only if these two numbers are equal. The probability of these events
depends only p
A, p












































































3. THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
The experiment was designed with many features in mind, both from
a logistical standpoint of experimental methodology, and from a paramet-
ric standpoint of choosing the specic parametric treatments. The primary
treatment variable in the experiment was the choice of parameters for the
game. After normalizing the payoffs (L and H), the game described in the
previoussectionisfullycharacterized by NA;NB;and f. Since the three cen-
tral hypotheses are the size effect, the underdog effect, and the competition
effect, we were able to test all three by xing f throughout the experiment,
and varying only NA and NB. The payoffs were L = 5 and H = 105. We
conducted elections with N 2 f3;9;27;51g. For each of these electorate
sizes, we have two subtreatments,3 one where NB = 2NA and one where
NB = NA+1. We refer to the former as the landslide treatment and the lat-
ter as the toss-up treatment. This modied 42 design is given in Table
1.
3When N = 3 these two treatments collapse into one treatment.THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 6
TABLE 1. Experimental Design
N NA NB #subjects #sessions #elections # obs
3 1 2 51 4 850 2550
9 3 6 81 9 450 4050
9 4 5 81 9 450 4050
27 9 18 108 4 200 5400
27 13 14 108 4 200 5400
51 17 34 102 2 100 5100
51 25 24 102 2 100 5100
Our choice of the cost distribution, f, was dictated by two considera-
tions, one theoretical and one logistical. Theoretically, there can be multiple
quasi-symmetric equilibria for some cost distributions and some values of
NA and NB. We needed to nd a distribution that had a unique equilibrium
for all of our different (NA;NB) treatments, and one that was also easy to
explain to naive subjects. A uniform distribution of voting costs ranging
from 0 to 55 satises both of these desiderata. Since the payoff for making
or breaking a tie is 50, voters who draw costs greater than 50 have a strict
dominantstrategyto abstain and voters with costs equal to 50 have a weakly
dominant strategy to abstain. Equilibrium is unique for all our treatments,
and the uniform distribution can be explained in terms of all costs within
a give range being equally likely. The unique Nash equilibrium turnout
probabilities for the two groups are given in Table 2.
There were six main logistical challenges to conducting our experiment.
First, we wanted a design that would be easy to explain to naive subjects
who know nothing about the model and may be completely unfamiliar with
abstract mathematical concepts such as probability distributions. Second,
we wanted to control the information ows so that individuals in the ex-
periment would know their own costs but only the distribution of costs for
the other individuals. Third, we wanted the parameters of the model and
the voting rule to be as close to common knowledge as possible. Fourth,
we wanted subjects to have an opportunity to gain experience, since past
experiments have shown that behavior in games with pure strategy equi-
libria shows systematic convergence of behavior with experience. Fifth, we
wanted a context-free design so that uncontrollableindividualfactors would
not add another source of noise or introduce alternative explanations for the
results. Sixth, we wanted a design which allowed within subject tests of the
hypothesized effects, as well as between subject tests.
Our design generates a number of comparative statics hypotheses. These
are listed below, with an explanation of each:THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 7
Hypotheses
For our hypotheses, we use the followingnotation. We denote the turnout
probability for the underdog as a function of the sizes of group A and group
B is by p
A(NA;NB) and the probability for the frontrunner by p
A(NA;NB).
Comparative Statics Hypotheses
H1. : The Size Effect. Holding the relative size of the two groups
constant, turnout in each party is decreasing in N. Formally, this
implies 42 specic hypotheses in the form of pairwise inequalities.


















3 ) for j =A;B. In addition,
there is the weaker hypothesis that total turnout is decreasing in N.
H2. : The Competition Effect: Holding the total size of the elec-
torate constant, turnout in each party is decreasing in NA NB. This















B(17;34). Note that this hypothesis does not apply for the N = 3
treatment, since N 1
2 = N
3 in that case.
H3. : The Underdog Effect. For N > 3, turnout of party A is greater
than turnout of party B. This gives us 6 specic hypotheses in















H4. : Counter-example to the Underdog Effect. For N = 3, turnout




In addition to these comparative statics hypotheses, there are the specic
quantitative hypotheses about turnout, given in Table 2. There are two ad-
ditional sets of hypotheses about aggregate outcomes, listed in the last two
columns of that table. The rst is the equilibrium probability of a pivotal
outcome. A pivotal outcome is one in which at least one voter is pivotal.
That is, the outcome is either a tie or one vote away from a tie. It is note-
worthy that if at least one voter is pivotal, then usually many voters are
pivotal. In fact, in the case the vote is exactly a tie, all voters in both parties
are pivotal, in the sense that if any single voter had voted differently, the tie
would be broken.THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 8
TABLE 2. Nash Equilibrium Predictions
N NA NB p
A p
B p Q
3 1 2 .537 .640 .810 .070
9 3 6 .413 .375 .599 .151
9 4 5 .460 .452 .666 .270
27 9 18 .270 .228 .409 .187
27 13 14 .302 .297 .466 .418
51 17 34 .206 .171 .309 .153
51 25 26 .238 .235 .375 .435
It is straightforward to show that the comparative statics for the proba-
bility of a pivotal outcome are ordered exactly the same as the equilibrium
turnout rates. This is true because in equilibrium the cutpoint for each party
is proportional to the probability of making or breaking a tie. We denote
this equilibrium probability p(NA;NB). This generates a parallel set of
hypotheses to H1 H2, which we call H5 and H6 and these parallel hy-
potheses are tested by looking at frequencies of pivotal events rather than
turnout rates. The exact quantitative pivot probabilities are given in Table
2.
H5 : The size effect on the frequency of Pivotal Events. Holding
the relative size of the two groups constant, the frequency of piv-
otal events is decreasing in N. Formally, this implies 21 specic
hypotheses in the form of pairwise inequalities. An example is
p(4;5) > p(13;14) . Generally these inequalities take the form










H6 : The competition effect on the frequency of Pivotal Events.
Holding the total size of the electorate constant, the frequency of
pivotal events is decreasing in NA  NB. This gives us 3 specic
hypotheses in the form of pairwise inequalities: p(4;5)> p(3;6);
p(13;14) > p(9;18); p(25;26) > p(17;34).
Finally, there is a separate set of hypotheses about the probability of an
upset. We dene an upset as an outcome of the election where the underdog
ties or receives more votes than the frontrunner. These upset probabilities
are higher in toss-up races than in landslide races, but do not vary much
withN. We denote the equilibriumupset probabilityby Q(NA;NB), and the
theoretical values for each treatment are in Table 2. This upset hypotheses
are stated formally below:THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 9
H7 : Upset Rates. The underdog is more likely to tie or win in toss-
up races than in landslide races, and these upset probabilities are
decreasing in N: This generates 15 specic hypotheses in the form
of pairwise inequalities. Twelve of these hypotheses are of the form
Q(N 1
2 ; N+1
2 ) > Q(M+1
2 ; M+1
2 ) and Q(N
3; 2N
3 ) > Q(M
3 ; 2M
3 ) for






In addition to hypotheses about aggregate behavior, the unique Bayesian
Nash equilibrium also makes very sharp predictions about individual be-
havior. Specically, all individuals should be using exact cutpoint rules.
Moreover, these cutpoint rules should be precisely those corresponding to
the turnout rates listed in Table 2. Obviously, hypotheses as sharp as this
will inevitably be rejected. The cutpoint rules are pure strategies, so a sin-
gle violation of the exact cutpoint rule by any subject in will completely
reject the theory. Accordingly, we will pursue these hypotheses in the re-
sults section more descriptively, rather than formally testing them. We will
however, consider a bounded rationality model in which subjects follow a
cutpoint rule stochastically - that is, they follow it most of the time, but vi-
olate it some of the time. This allows us to classify subjects according to
their propensity to vote, which we expect to vary due to many diverse fac-
tors such as expectations about pivotal events, risk aversion, attitudes about
group norms, social preferences, judgement fallacies and so forth.
There are also qualitative hypotheses that can be addressed at the indi-
vidual level. In our design, subjects were in only one electorate size (3, 9,
27, or 51), but participated in a multiple elections, both toss-up and land-
slide, and participated as members of both the small group and the large
group. This is explained in more detail in the next session. Accordingly, we
address H2, H3, and H4 at the individual level as well as at the aggregate
level.
4. EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL
Subjects were recruited by email announcement from a subject pool con-
sisting of registered UCLA students. A total of 284 different subjects par-
ticipated in the study. We conduced 20 separate sessions using networked
computers at the CASSEL experimental facility.4 In each session, N was
held xed throughout the entire session. For the N > 3 sessions, there were
two subsessions of 50 rounds each; one subsession was the toss-up treat-
ment and the other subsession was the landslide treatment. The sequencing
4The software was programmed as server/client applications in Java,
using the open source experimental software package called Multistage
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of the two treatments was done both ways for each N. Before each round,
each subject was assigned to either group A or group B and assigned a vot-
ing cost, drawn independently from the uniform distribution between 0 and
55, in integer increments.5 Therefore, each subject gained experience as a
member of the majority and minority party for exactly one value of N, and
participated in both 50 landslide and 50 toss-up elections. Instructions were
read aloud so everyone could hear, and Powerpoint slides were projected
in front of the room to help explain the rules and to make all the common
knowledge to the extent possible. After the instructions were read, subjects
were walked throughtwo practice rounds with randomly forced choices and
then were required to correctly answer all the questions on a computerized
comprehension quiz before the experiment began. After the rst 50 rounds,
a very short set of new instructions were read aloud, explaining that the
sizes of group A and group B would be different for the next 50 rounds.
The wording in the instructions was written so as to induce as neutral
an environment as possible.6 There was no mention of voting or winning
or losing or costs. The labels were abstract. The smaller groups was re-
ferred to the alpha group (A) and the larger group was referred to as the
beta group (B). Individuals were asked in each round to choose X or Y. If
more members of A(B) chose X than members of B(A) chose X, then each
member of A(B) received 105 and each member of group B(A) received 5.
In case of a tie, each member of each group received 55 (the expected value
of a fair coin toss). Therefore, voting corresponded to choosing X and
abstaining corresponded to choosing Y. The voting cost was referred to
as a Y bonus, and was added to a player's earnings if that player chose
Y instead of X in an election. Therefore, the voting cost was implemented
as an opportunity cost. If a player chose X, that player did not receive their
Y bonus for that election. Bonuses were randomly redrawn in every round,
independently for each subject, and subjects were only told their own Y
bonus. 7
The N = 3 sessions were conducted slightly differently. First, there were
only 50 rounds, since the toss-up and landslide treatments were identical.
Second, the sessions were conducted with either 12 or 15 subjects, who
were randomly rematched each round into subgroups of 3 each period, be-
fore being assigned a party and a voting cost. This allowed us to obtain a
5Every 100 points paid off $.37.
6A sample of the instructions from one of the 27 person sessions is in the Appendix.
7We ran two additional sessions with n=9 where the instructions were presented in the
context of voting decision in elections, and the two groups were referred to as parties. The
results were nearly identical and are discussed briey in the results section.THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 11
comparable number of subjects for the N = 3 treatment as the other treat-
ments.
5. RESULTS
5.1. Aggregate results. The analysis of results at the aggregate level is
carried out at three levels. First, we look at the empirical turnout rates,
and how they vary with respect electorate size, the competitiveness of the
election, and whether voters are from the majority or minority parties. This
enables us to address hypotheses H1 H4. Next, we focus on outcomes,
and show how the empirical frequencies of pivotal events and upsets vary
with electorate size and electoral competitiveness.
5.1.1. Turnout Rates. Table 3 displays the observed turnout rates for each
party and each treatment, denoted b p with standard errors in parenthesis,
alongside the Nash equilibrium values.8 Out of 42 pairwise comparisons of
turnout rates, 40 have the same sign as predicted by the theory.
TABLE 3. Turnout Rates - Comparison of Theory and Data
N NA NB b pA pNash
A pl=7
A b pB pNash
B pl=7
B
3 1 2 .530 (.017) .537 .549 .593 (.012) .640 .616
9 3 6 .436 (.013) .413 .421 .398 (.009) .374 .395
9 4 5 .479 (.012) .460 .468 .451 (.010) .452 .463
27 9 18 .377 (.011) .270 .297 .282 (.007) .228 .275
27 13 14 .385(.009) .302 .348 .356 (.009) .297 .345
51 17 34 .333 (.011) .206 .245 .266 (.008) .171 .230
51 25 26 .390 (.010) .238 .301 .362 (.009) .235 .300
Figure 1 graphs the observed and predicted turnout rates for all the vari-
ous treatments and both parties. The dotted lines represent the actual data.
The dashed lines are the Nash equilibriumturnout rates. The solid lines cor-
respond to the quantal response equilibrium turnout rates, and are explained
later. The left side graphs show the majority turnout rates as a function of
electorate size; the right hand side graphs show minority turnout rates.
8The standard errors assume independence of the observations. Since there is depen-
dence due to multiple observations of the same individual, these should be interpreted as a
lower bound on the standard errors. We take a second look at this by examining individual
effects in the next section.THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 12
FIGURE 5.1. Minorityand MajorityParty TurnoutRates As
Function of Electorate Size
Hypotheses about the competition effect (H2), the underdog effect (H3),
and the 3-voter counterexample to the underdog effect (H4), are supported
without exception. That is, all pairwise comparisons of turnout rates for
those hypotheses are the same as predicted by the theory. Particularly note-
worthy (and surprising to us), is the support for H4: the minority turns out
less than the majority in only one instance, which is precisely the one pre-
dicted by the theory (NA = 1;NB = 2). In all other cases, there is greater
turnout by the minority party.
The size effect, H1;is supported with the exception of the comparison of
turnout in tossup races with 27 versus 51 voters. In that comparison, both
the minority and majority parties vote slightly more often in the 51 case
than the 27 case, but these are both quantitatively smaller than all other
differences (.005 and .006, respectively), and neither is large relative to
sampling variation as measured by the standard errors.
Quantitatively, the turnout rates we observe for the smallest electorate
(N=3), are signicantly lower than predicted by theory, turnout rates for
somewhat larger electorates (N=9) are approximately equal to the Nash
equilibrium value, while turnout rates for the largest electorates (N=27,51)THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 13
are higher than predicted by theory.9 As a general rule, we nd that turnout
rates are closer to :5 than theory predicts. This mirrors ndings by Goeree
and Holt (2005) for a broad class of games with a similar structure to our
voter turnout experiments.10
We conducted two additional sessions with N = 9, as a robustness check
for the abstract context. In these session, we changed the terminology of
X and Y to Vote and Abstain. Each round was referred to as an
election, groups were called parties, and so forth. The turnout rates are
given in Table 4, side by side with the results from sessions run with an
abstract protocol, with standard errors in parenthesis. Three differences are
positiveand one is negative. All are small in magnitude, and are small com-
pared to the sampling variation in the Election Context Protocol estimates
as measured by the standard errors.
TABLE 4. Comparison of Turnout Rates Across Protocols
N = 9
Abstract Protocol Election Context Protocol
b pA tossup 479 (.012) 0.475 (.022)
b pB tossup .451 (.010) 0.480 (.018)
b pA landslide .436 (.013) 0.460 (.025)
b pB landslide .398 (.0094) 0.400 (.018)
We also report the results of a simple probit regression of the probability
a voter turns out as a function of which party the voter was in (majority or
minority), whether the or not the race was a toss-up, and the size of the elec-
torate. The results are given below in Table 5, along with T-statistics. The
coefcients on all three variables are highly signicant, and have the pre-
dicted signs: negative effect of majority party membership; positive effect
of toss-up; and negative effect of electorate size.
TABLE 5. Probit Regression of Turnout on Treatment Variables




majority party -.113 (.015)
9An exception is majority party turnout in the n = 9 tossup races, where turnout is less
than the Nash equilibrium (but not statistically signicant).
10They study binary choice games such as threshold public goods games, where ob-
served contribution rates tend to exceed the equilibrium predictions when the equilibrium
is below :5, and are too low when the equilibrium is above :5 percent.THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 14
Because the observed turnout frequencies in the sessions with N=3,27,51
were signicantlydifferentfromthe Nash equilibriumturnoutrates, we also
included a variable for experience, which takes on values from 1 to 50, cor-
responding to the round number. Recall that each treatment in each session
lasted for 50 rounds. We hypothesisthat behavior should converge in the di-
rection of Nash equilibrium, a phenomenon that has been widely observed
in game theory experiments. However, the effect of experience should be
different depending on N. For N=9, aggregate turnout rates are almost ex-
actly equal to Nash prediction, so we do not expect experience to change
behavior. For N=3, observed turnout is too low, so convergence in the di-
rection of equilibrium implies that the sign of the experience coefcient
should be positive. The opposite should be true for N=27 and N=51, since
observed turnout is too high. Because the expected effects differ across N,
we estimate the effect separately for each N.
The results are given in Table 6, and provide some support for the idea
that behavior is adjusting in the direction of equilibrium. For both the N=27
and the N=51 sessions, the coefcient on experience is precisely estimated
and negative. In both cases, there was approximately a 5 percentage point
drop in turnout between the rst and last rounds, controlling for party and
tossup. For the N=3 sessions, the coefcient is positive, as predicted, but
there is insufcient data to distinguish is clearly from zero. For N=9, the
coefcient is virtually equal to zero, as expected.
TABLE 6. Probit Regression of Turnout by Size of Electorate
Dep=Vote N
3 9 27 51
constant .058 (.053) -.15 (.042) -.31 (.033) -.41 (.034)
tossup  .094 (.032) .13 (.025) .22 (.026)
majority party .088 (.053) -.079 (.033) .16 (.025) -.13 (.026)
experience .0016 (.0017) -.0002 (.001) -.0028 (.0009) -.0025 (.0009)
5.1.2. Upsets and Pivotal Events. Table 6 displays the observed and equi-
libriumfrequencies of pivotalevents, p, for each treatment and the observed
and equilibrium upset rates, Q. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 15
TABLE 7. Pivotal Events and Upset Rates. Comparison of
Theory and Data
N NA NB p b p Q b Q #elections
3 1 2 .810 .846 (.007) .070 .092 (.006) 850
9 3 6 .599 .580 (.008) .151 .146 (.005) 450
9 4 5 .666 .697 (.007) .270 .280 (.007) 450
27 9 18 .409 .395 (.007) .187 .165 (.005) 200
27 13 14 .466 .440 (.007) .418 .435 (.007) 200
51 17 34 .309 .260 (.006) .153 .170 (.005) 100
51 25 26 .375 .390 (.007) .435 .440 (.007) 100
Overall, the data provide strong support for hypotheses H5, H6, and H7.
Every single one of the 21 size effect inequalities for pivotal events (H5)
are observed in the data, and all three of the competition effect inequalities
for pivotal events (H6) are also found. The same is true for the 15 predicted
inequalitiesfor upsets (H7), withonlyone exception: b Q(9;18)< b Q(17;34),
but the difference is only 0:005.
Also noteworthy is the fact that the data tracks the theory very closely
quantitatively, as well as qualitatively. Indeed the quantitative departures
from theory are behaviorally meaningless. To illustrate this, gure 2 graphs
the observed and predicted values of p and Q for all treatments. A simple
linear regression of observed on theoretical rates, using all 14 data points
in the gure (including both pivot probabilities and upsets) produces an
intercept equal to 0:01, a slope equal to 1:03 and an R2 = :99.
FIGURE 5.2. Pivotal Events and UpsetsTHE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 16
5.2. Quantal Response Equilibrium turnout rates. In this voter partic-
ipation game, subjects with cutpoints close to the equilibrium cutpoint are
nearly indifferent between voting and abstaining. Consequently, very small
errors in their judgment about the pivot probabilities, or other factors, could
lead them to make a suboptimal decision. With this in mind, it makes sense
to explore models such errors are possible and where the probabilityof such
errors are derived endogenously in the model.
One alternative is to allow a small amount of bounded rationality and
assume that players are not optimizing but instead choose according to a
Logit stochastic choice rule. If they also have rational expectations, then
it is called the Logit quantal response equilibrium model. In a quantal
response equilibrium, decision making no longer follows a deterministic
cutpoint rule. Rather, a voter's turnout probability is a continuous strictly
increasing function of voting cost, t(), which is equal to .5 precisely at
the voting cost at which the voter is exactly indifferent between voting and
abstaining. If pj is the probability of a voter in party j is pivotal (which
will generally be different for minority and majority voters), then in a logit





where l is the logit response parameter. Integrating over all possible voting






There will be one such equation for each party, analogous to equations 1
and 2 in the Nash equilibrium analysis.11
Since this is an equilibrium model, pj is determined endogenously, and
will depend on l, since it depends on p
j, which depends on tj, which in
turn depends on l. The equilibrium pivot probabilities, fpA(l);pB(l)g, are
then computed using formulas similar to equations 3 and 4.
The logit response parameter, l is a free parameter corresponding to the
slope of the logit response curve. We estimate this free parameter to obtain
a t of the data to the logit QRE model. To avoid overtting, we constrain
l to be the same in all treatments. This is a straightforward estimation
exercise. Using the data, it is easy to compute the maximum likelihood
estimate of l based on the pooled data from all treatments. We do this by
actually computing the logit equilibrium of each game for a grid of values
of l, and then can directly construct the likelihood function of our pooled
11The Nash equilibrium analysis is equivalent to the limiting case of l = ¥.THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 17
data, as a function of l. This yields a maximum likelihood estimate equal
tob l = 7.
We then use that estimated value, b l = 7, along with the actual draws
of voting costs, to compute for each treatment and each part, theoretical
QRE turnout rates, denoted pl=7. These are given in two columns of Table
3, and also displayed in Figure 1. Two observations are clear. First, the
QRE model ts the data better. Second, the QRE model provides exactly
the right qualitative correction to the Nash model. Recall that the Nash
model underpredicted turnout in larger elections and overpredicted turnout
in small elections, and did fairly well for intermediate-sized elections. The
QRE predicts less turnout than Nash equilibrium in the smallest election,
and more turnout than Nash equilibrium in the large elections. QRE also
predicts even greater amounts of overvoting (relative to Nash), as the size
of the election becomes larger and larger, which is what we observed in the
data.
As an alternative way to see how well the logit choice model is capturing
voter behavior, Figure 5.3 graphs turnout rates by normalized voting cost.
For each treatment and each party, we dene a normalized votingcost as the
difference between a voter'sactual votingcost and the logitequilibriumcut-
point (for l = 7). Thus, for example, if the QRE cutpoint for an A voter in
some treatment were, say, 15, and their actual cost were 25, their normal-
ized voting cost would be 10. Thus our normalization allows us to display
all the voting behavior in a single graph. According to the logit QRE, the
voting probabilities should follow a logit curve, which is the smooth de-
creasing curve in the gure (for l = 7). The decreasing step-function curve
averages the data across normalized cost intervals of .03.THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 18
FIGURE 5.3. Turnout Rates as Function of Cost, Compared
to Logit Response with l = 7
5.3. Individual Results. We turn now from examining the aggregate im-
plications of the theory to implications for individual behavior. Nash equi-
librium predicts that all subjects should follow a common cutpoint rule -
that is, the smooth logit curve in Figure 5.3 should be a vertical line at zero.
In fact, as that graph shows, individual behavior shows substantially more
variationthan Nashequilibriumallows,heterogeneitythat iswell accounted
for by the additionalQRE parameter. We now look at more detail at the play
of specic subjects.
5.3.1. Estimating Individual Cutpoints. To summarize the behavior of in-
dividual subjects, we assume that each subject is following a cutpoint rule
and attempt to estimate subject by subject what that rule is. Recall that best
responses always take the form of cutoff rules, whereby a voter should vote
if and only if the cost they draw is greater than or equal to a critical cost
level, c.
For each treatment and each subject, we estimated cutpoint rules in the
following simple way. For each subject i and treatment j, we have Kij
observations of cost, decision pairs (ct;dt). Fix a cutpoint 0  cij  55. If
for observation t in this sample of Kij observations we have
(1) ct < cij and dt = vote or if
(2) ct > cij and dt = abstain or ifTHE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 19
(3) ct = cij
we say that observation t is consistent with the cutpoint cij. Otherwise, we
say that observation t is an error with respect to the cutpoint cij.12 The
estimated cutpoint, b cij is the cutpoint that one that minimizes the number of
errors.13
Using this procedure, we can produce a distribution of cutpoints for each
treatment and a distribution of error rates for each treatment. Figures 5.4
and 5.5 show the cumulative distribution of cutpoints for all of the treat-
ments.
12Alternatively, one could discount the error by how close the cost is to the cutpoint.
This could be done for example by estimating for each ij pair a logit choice function and
dening the estimated cutpoint as the point at which the estimated logit choice probability
is exactly :5.
13In case there are multiple error-minimizing cutpoints, we use the average of them.THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 20
FIGURE 5.4. Landslide Cumulative Distributions of CutpointsTHE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 21
FIGURE 5.5. Tossup Cumulative Distribution of Cutpoints
The density for error rates is shown in Figure 5.6. As can be seen, there
are errors, but in general not so many, indicating that to a reasonable ap-
proximation individuals followed consistent cutpoint rules.THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 22
FIGURE 5.6. Cutpoint Error Density
5.3.2. Toss-ups and Landslides. We turn now to comparative statics at the
individual level. For the experiments with N > 3, we have four paired ob-
servations for individuals: holding xed whether the individualis in the mi-
nority or majority, we can consider the difference in their cutpoint between
a tossup and a landslide; holding xed whether the election is a tossup or a
landslide, we can consider the difference in their cutpoint between being in
the minorityand the majority. According to the theory - either Nash or QRE
- all of these differences should be positive. Table 8 reports the fraction of
these differences that are positive. As can be seen, this is always above 50%THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 23
and generally 60% or higher. This is reinforced by Table 9 which reports
the average size of these differences. These numbers are all positive.
TABLE 8. Fraction of Positive Paired Differences
Minority Majority Tossup Landslide
N Tossup-Landslide Tossup-Landslide Minority-Majority Minority-Majority
51 0.60 0.75 0.52 0.65
27 0.56 0.68 0.56 0.68
9 0.56 0.60 0.62 0.56
3 0.57
TABLE 9. Average Size of Paired Differences
Minority Majority Tossup Landslide
N Tossup-Landslide Tossup-Landslide Minority-Majority Minority-Majority
51 3.2 4.4 1.8 3.1
27 1.1 4.6 1.2 4.7
9 2.6 1.7 2.7 1.8
3 0.10
6. CONCLUSIONS
There are six main ndings from this voter turnout experiment.
First, and most important, all of the comparative statics from the standard
Bayesian Nash equilibrium model of instrumental strategic voting were
strongly supported by the data. We nd strong evidence for the size ef-
fect, the competition effect, and the underdog effect. The evidence is based
on turnout rates, frequency of pivotal events, and upset probabilities. It is
further supported by individual level analysis that was possible because of
the experiment's mixed within/across subject design, which allows us to
compare an individual subject's decisions in multiple treatments.
Second, voters are highly responsive to voting cost, with turnout rates
declining sharply with the cost of voting. As a rst approximation, most
voters use cutpoint strategies, as predicted by the theory.
Third, a closelookat individualbehavior revealsthatfew votersuse exact
deterministiccutpoint strategies; choice behavior appears to have a stochas-
tic element. This replicates a nding from several other studies of games
with binary choices and continuous types, where best response rules are
cutpoint strategies.14
14See, for example, Casella, Gelman, and Palfrey (2005), Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997),
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Fourth, voters were less responsive to changes in the parameters of the
environmentthanthe equilibrium. Inparticular, thisresulted inturnoutrates
that were too low for N = 3 and that exceeded the Nash equilibrium rates
for the larger groups, with overvoting especially noticeable in the N = 51
treatment.
Fifth, an equilibrium approach based on the logit version of QRE, which
incorporates the kind of stochastic choice observed at the individual level,
provides a signicant improvement in t over the Nash model, as well as
providing an explanation for undervoting (relative to Nash) in small elec-
tions and overvoting in large elections. Furthermore, the responsiveness of
participation rates to voting costs is tracked very closely by a logit curve
(Figure 3). Nonetheless, the logit QRE model may not fully account for the
magnitude of overvoting in the largest elections of our sample, unless there
are higher error rates (smaller l) in larger elections, a possibilitywhich does
not have an obvious rationale a priori.
Sixth, the experiment was conducted in a neutral abstract context with no
mention of voting, or winning, or parties or elections. In the two extra ses-
sions conducted specically in a voting context, subject behavior was the
same as the abstract context. Hence the phenomena we observe apparently
are not limited to elections, but are more general. In particular the observa-
tion of overvoting relative to the equilibrium cannot be easily dismissed by
appealing to arguments such as citizen duty, high school civics classes, or
fear that one's spouse of workmates will castigate one for not voting.
The challenge now is to come up with an explanation of over voting that
is not specic to elections, but applies more broadly to participation games
in general. The one alternative explored here, QRE, provides a partial ex-
planation, but undershoots the overvoting in large elections. Another ex-
planation we have considered, that voters systematically overestimate the
probability of being pivotal, is directly contradicted by the N = 3 data,
where weobserveovervoting. For thesame reason, our dataalsocontradicts
group-specic altruism models, and also the group-utilitarian approach of
Harsanyi (1980), recently proposed as an explanation of high voter turnout
by Feddersen and Sandroni (2002).
Another alternative model minimax regret, is due to Ferejohn and Fio-
rina. That model is easily rejected, because it implies that turnout should
independent the probability of being decisive, which contradicts the size
effect, the competition effect, and the underdog effect.
We conjecture that some kind of mixture of models such as these, that
would include a variety of behavioral types, will ultimately be needed for
a more complete explanation of this phenomenon. One framework for
building and estimating such models has been developed by El-Gamal andTHE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 25
Grether (1995), and such an approach may be worth exploring here. How-
ever, developing a specication of types for the voting context that is not
simply ad hoc would be a challenge, and the actual computation and esti-
mation of such a model may be difcult.
In conclusion, the strength of the comparative statics results should not
be understated. The fact that the experiment clearly supports the three main
equilibrium comparative static effects (size, competition, and underdog) in
participation games, and the nding that voters use approximate cutpoint
strategies, demonstrates that voting behavior is highly strategic, with voters
responding to both the cost of voting and the probability of being pivotal.THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 26
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APPENDIX
Sample instructions from a 9 person session (abstract protocol)
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research experiment on
group decision making. During the experiment we require your complete,
undistracted attention. So we ask that you follow instructions carefully.
Please do not open other applications on your computer, chat with other
students, read books or do homework.
For your participation, you will be paid in cash, at the end of the experi-
ment. Different participants may earn different amounts. What you earn de-
pends partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly
on chance. So it is important that you listen carefully, and fully understand
the instructions before we begin. There will be a short comprehension quiz
after the upcoming practice round, which you all need to pass before we
can begin the paid sessions.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and
all interaction between you will take place through the computers. It is
important that you not talk or in any way try to communicate with other
participants during the experiments, except according to the rules described
in the instructions.
We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction pe-
riod, you will be given a complete description of the experiment and will
be shown how to use the computers. If you have any questions during the
instruction period, raise your hand and your question will be answered out
loud so everyone can hear. If any difculties arise after the experiment has
begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you pri-
vately.
Please open your envelope and remove the Record Sheet. Do not lose
this Record Sheet, as you will need the sheet throughout the experiment to
record your earnings.
This experiment will begin with two brief practice sessions to help fa-
miliarize you with the rules. The practice session will be followed by 2
different paid sessions. Each paid session will consist of 50 rounds.
At the end of the last paid session, you will be paid the sum of what you
have earned in the two paid sessions, plus the show-up fee of $5.00. Ev-
eryone will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to tell others
how much you earned. Your earnings during the experiment are denomi-
nated in POINTS. Your DOLLAR earnings are determined by multiplyingTHE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 28
your earnings in POINTS by a conversion rate. In this experiment, the con-
version rate is 0.0037, meaning that 100 POINTS is worth 37 cents.
There are 9 participants in today's experiment. You will participate in 2
brief practice sessions and then 2 paid sessions of 50 rounds each.
Please turn your attention to the screen at the front of the room. We will
demonstrate how the rounds are played.
SCREEN 1 (menu)
Everyone should have a screen like the screen projected on stage. If you
have something different from what is projected on stage, please raise your
hand and the staff will assist you.
[CHECK TO SEE IF ANYONE RAISES THEIR HAND]
Please do notbeginunlesswe tellyoutodoso. Please haveyour attention
focused on the stage during this demonstration period. Please click on the
MENU icon. This will bring up screen 2 showing the icons underneath.
SCREEN 2 (icons)
On this second screen click on the MULTISTAGE CLIENT icon. A pop
up window will appear right in front of you.
SCREEN 3 (client information)
Enter your rst and last name in the box that appears and then click sub-
mit. You will then see screen 4
SCREEN 4 (initializing)
Once everyone has logged in, you will be randomly assigned to one of
two groups the ALPHA group or the BETA group. You will see screen 5
SCREEN 5 (user interface)
At the top of the screen is your id number. Please record this on your
Record Sheet. Below this the screen informs you which group you are in
and how many members there are in each group. In this practice session,
the ALPHA group has 4 members and the BETA group has 5 members.
Next on the screen is a table, describing how your earnings depend on your
choice of either X or Y and on which group has the most members choosing
X. The display in front of the room shows you what the screen looks like
for a member of the Alpha group. It also tells you what your Y bonus is.
We will explain what this means in a moment.
You will choose either X and Y by highlighting the corresponding row
label and clicking with your mouse.
SCREEN 6x and 6y and 7 (showing highlighting)
Your earnings are computed in the following way. It is very important
that you understand this, so please listen carefully. Suppose you choose
X. If your group has more members choosing X than the other group, then
you will earn 105 points; if both groups have the same number of members
choosing X, then you will earn 55 points, and if the other group has more
members choosing X than your group, then you will earn 5 points.THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 29
Alternatively, suppose you choose Y. If your group has more members
choosing X than the other group, then you will earn 105 points plus your
Y bonus; if both groups have the same number of members choosing X,
then you will earn 55 points plus your Y bonus, and if the other group has
more members choosing X than your group, then you will earn 5 points
plus your Y bonus. The amount of your Y-bonus is assigned randomly by
the computer and is shown in the fourth line down from the top of your
screen. In any given round you have an equal chance of being assigned
any Y-bonus between 0 and 55 points. Your Y-bonus in each round does
not depend on your Y-bonus or decisions in previous rounds, or on the Y-
bonuses and decisions of other participants. Since Y-bonuses are assigned
separately for each participant, different participants will typically have dif-
ferent Y-bonuses. While you are told your own Y-bonus, you are never told
the Y-bonuses of other participants. You only know that each of the other
participants has a Y-bonus that is some number between 0 and 55.
Here is an example: Suppose that one member of the ALPHA group
chose X and two members of the BETA group choose X. Then the BETA
group has more members choosing X than the ALPHA group. Each mem-
ber of the ALPHA group who chose X earns 5 points; each member of the
ALPHA group who chose Yearns 5 points plus his or her own personal Y-
bonus ; the members of the BETA group who chose X earn 105 points, and
each member of the BETA group who chose Yearns 105 points plus his or
her personal Y-bonus.
The bottom of the screen contains a history panel. During the various
sessions and rounds, this panel will be updated to reect the history of your
past sessions.
After you and the other participants have all made your choices of X
or Y the screen will change to highlight the row corresponding to your own
choice, and the columnof the group whichhad the greatest number of mem-
bers choose X.
At the end of each round until the session ends, you will be randomly
dividedbetween groups, and will have the opportunityto choose between X
and Y. In other words, you will not necessarily be in the same group during
each round. At the end of each session, you will see a screen summarizing
the amount that you earned.
SCREEN 8 (match complete)
If you have any questions at this time, please raise your hand and
ask your question so that everyone in the room may hear it.
PRACTICE SESSION
[BRING UP PAYMENT SCREEN FOR PRACTICE SESSION]
We will now give you a chance to get used to the computers with a short
practice session. Please take your time, and do not press any keys or useTHE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 30
your mouse until instructed to do so. You will NOT be paid for this ses-
sion, it is just to allow you to get familiar with the experiment and your
computers.
If your ID number is even, please highlight the Y row and click; if your
ID number is odd, please highlight the X row and click. Once everyone has
made their selection, the results from this rst practice round are displayed
on your screen.
Remember, you are not paid for this practice round.
We will now proceed to the second practice round. Notice that you may
have been reassigned to a new group, since the group assignments are shuf-
ed randomly between each round. Please make the opposite choice from
the choice you made in the rst practice round. That is, if your ID number
is even, please highlight the X row label and click; if your ID number is
odd, please highlight the Y row label and click. Once everyone has made
their selection, the results from this second practice round are displayed on
your screen.
Since this is the end of the practice round, your total earnings for this
practice session are displayed on your screen in points (though of course,
youwontactually receivethat money). We havenowcompletedthe practice
session.
[QUIZ]
You will notice that a quiz has popped up on your screen. Please read
each question carefully and check the correct answer. Once everyone has
answered the questions correctly, you may all go on to the second stage of
the quiz. After successfully completing the second round of questions, we
will commence with the rst paid session. If you have difculty with the
quiz or have other questions please your hand.
[END QUIZ]
The rst paid session will follow the same rules as the practice session.
Let me summarize those rules before we start. Please listen carefully. In
each round of this session, 4 players will be randomly assigned to the Alpha
Group and 5 players will be assigned to the Beta Group. You may choose
X or Y. As you can see on the table of this screen, if you choose X, your
payoff will be 105 POINTS if your group has more members choosing X
than the other group, 5 POINTS if your group has fewer members choosing
X, and 55 POINTS if it is a tie. If you choose Y, you will also receive the
Y-bonus shown on your screen..
There will be 50 rounds in this session. After each round, group assign-
ments will be randomly reshufed. Therefore, in some rounds you will be
in the Alpha group and in other rounds you will be in the Beta group. In
either case, everyone is told which group they are in before making a choice
of X or Y.THE PARADOX OF VOTER PARTICIPATION? A LABORATORY STUDY 31
Are there any questions before we begin the rst paid session
[Answer questions.]
Please pull out your dividers.
SESSION 1
We will now begin with session 1. Do not click anything else on the
screen until you are told to do so.
[BRING UP PAYMENT SCREEN FOR SESSION 1]
Please begin.
(Play rounds 1 50)
Session 1 is now over. Please record your total payoffs for this session
on your record sheet.
[WAIT FOR STAFF TO VERIFY PARTICIPANTS RECORD SHEET]
SESSION 2
We will now begin session 2.
[BRING UP PAYMENT SCREEN FOR SESSION 2]
The second paid session will be slightly different from the rst session.
Let me summarize those rules before we start. Please listen carefully. In
each round of this session, 3 players will be randomly assigned to the Alpha
Group and 6 players will be assigned to the Beta Group. You may choose
X or Y. As you can see on the table of this screen, if you choose X, your
payoff will be 105 POINTS if your group has more members choosing X
than the other group, 5 POINTS if your group has fewer members choosing
X, and 55 POINTS if it is a tie. If you choose Y you will also receive the
Y-bonus shown on your screen..
There will be 50 rounds in this session. After each round, group assign-
ments will be randomly reshufed. Therefore, some rounds you will be in
the Alpha group and other rounds you will be in the Beta group. In either
case, everyone is told which group they are in before making a choice of X
or Y.
Are there any questions before we begin the second paid session?
Please Begin.
(Play rounds 1-50)
Session 2 is now over. Please record your total payoffs for this session
on your record sheet.